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I 
When you and I recollect the content of Conan Doyle’s A Study in Scarlet we could say: 
 1. Sherlock Holmes smokes a pipe. 
I assume that reports about the content of a fictional story are best understood as im-
plicitly prefixed by Lewis’s (1978) intensional operator, which transforms a proposi-
tion like Sherlock Holmes smokes a pipe into a true one if it is part of the story content1. 
Hence, (1) is of the more complex form ‘It is part of the fiction that S’. But what is 
the meaning of the name ‘Sherlock Holmes’ and what kind of proposition is the one 
expressed by (1)? 
 If we were to consider fictional names as genuine names we would probably as-
sume one of two main referentialist options. On one side is Millianism, whose core 
idea is that the meaning of a proper name is exhausted by its referent (Salmon 1998, p. 
278). On the other side is direct reference theory, which says that the truth-conditional 
contribution of certain singular expressions – including names – is not given through 
the mediation of definite descriptions (Kaplan 1989, p. 483). Upholders of both views 
argue that sentences containing (non-empty) singular terms refer to individuals directly 
and express singular propositions. However, we all know that Sherlock Holmes does 
not exist, that he is merely the product of Conan Doyle’s imagination. In both theo-
ries, a name without referent has no semantic content, and sentences containing 
                                                     
* Thanks to Stefano Predelli and Manuel García-Carpintero for extensiva discussions, and to Stacie 
Friend, Greg Currie, Alberto Voltolini, Victor-Martín Verdejo and others for comments and criti-
cisms on earlier drafts of this paper read in Nottingham, Barcelona and Girona. Thanks also to an 
anonymous referee for generous feedback. Thanks to Peter Cottee for grammatical revisions. Finan-
cial support was provided by the research project HUM2006-08236 C-Consolider, the Spanish Minis-
try of Science and Innovation (MICINN) and the Dirección General de Investigación.  
1 Whether this option can dispense with the notion of pretense is an independent issue that does not 
concern us in this essay.  
Fiora SALIS 
Theoria 68 (2010): 175-185 
176
empty names do not have any semantic content either, that is, they do not express any 
propositions. 
 Critics of referentialism consider it inadequate for the analysis of fictional reports 
for two reasons. First, referentialism does not allow (1) to have any truth-conditional 
content. Second, it does not account for a speaker’s genuine understanding of (1) and, 
consequently, of the content of stories involving fictional names. Alternative solutions 
have been proposed by different descriptivist analyses in which ‘Sherlock Holmes’ is 
not a genuine name and its meaning consists of one or more definite descriptions. 
Kaplan (1973), Currie (1990) and Lamarque and Olsen (1994) defended different ver-
sions of this view. 
 Nevertheless I believe that there are good reasons to consider standard descriptiv-
ist analyses of fictional names as inadequate, and I will offer a critical discussion of 
them in section two. In section three I will present my own positive account, inspired 
by Richard’s (1990) sophisticated sententialism for propositional attitudes but also by 
Larson & Ludlow’s (1993) account of propositions as interpreted logical forms and by 
Braun’s (2005) gappy proposition theory. I will contend that the logical form of a sen-
tence containing a specific name (with or without referent) is determined by its previ-
ous individuation through the notion of name-using practice. The logical structure of 
a sentence containing a name inherits the relevant component and can be fully identi-
fied. Even though a fictional name does not contribute any referent to the truth-
conditions of a sentence, the gappy propositional content will consist of an inter-
preted logical form fully individuated by its specific logical structure. In Section four I 
will draw my conclusions. 
II  
Two main versions of descriptivism should be carefully distinguished. For upholders 
of the strong version (henceforth SD), originally introduced by Russell (1905), fic-
tional names are not genuine names. Their truth-conditional contribution consists of 
one or more synonymous definite descriptions, and the content of sentences contain-
ing fictional names is a general proposition with a quantificational structure. In the 
contemporary debate, Currie’s exemplary and complex version of SD is often taken to 
be paradigmatic but the criticisms I will put forward are independent of his specific 
holistic proposal2. For this reason I will define SD as the view in which the semantic 
content of ‘Sherlock Holmes’ is the Φ, i.e. the name is an abbreviation for the com-
plex predicate Φ that encompasses (ideally) all or most of the properties attributed by 
the author to a specific character in the story. When recollecting the content of A 
Study in Scarlet one could say: 
 2. Holmes is the Φ. 
By replacing ‘Holmes’ with its synonym set of definite descriptions we obtain the fol-
lowing: 
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 3. If anyone is the unique Φ, then that is Sherlock Holmes. 
Namely, if anyone is the unique intelligent English detective who lives at 221B Baker Street, 
smokes the pipe etc. then that person is Sherlock Holmes. Hence, if SD is correct, (3) is 
analytically true, i.e. it is a logical truth. 
 Others might maintain that fictional names are names (albeit of a special kind) and 
yet endorse a weaker version of descriptivism (henceforth WD) that is compatible 
with direct reference theory. To my knowledge, no author has offered a full account 
of fictional names on these lines3, but its potential upholders may argue that one or 
more reference-fixing descriptions associated with a fictional name n constitute its 
meaning and determine its referential content, if any. And yet in the anti-realist 
framework that I endorse, weak descriptivism would be subject to the same criticisms 
that are directed at referentialism. It would hold that sentences containing fictional 
names without referents do not express any semantic content. It would also hold that 
speakers can have only a deficient or incomplete understanding of such sentences by 
grasping their associated cognitive contents4. Even though ‘Holmes’ does not refer to 
anything, its meaning is expressed in terms of one or more definite descriptions such 
as the pipe smoker, the intelligent detective living at 221B Baker Street and so on, which serve 
both as conditions on reference and as cognitive contents available to competent users 
of the name. Hence, WD entails analyticity at the level of character. There are several 
notable arguments against SD and WD. 
 Kripke’s (1980) semantic argument concerns what the name would actually denote 
if the conditions represented by Φ were in fact obtained. If, for example, someone 
were to find out that there really was an intelligent English detective who lived at 
221B Baker Street, smoked a pipe and was and did everything that Conan Doyle tells 
us of the fictional Sherlock Holmes, both SD and WD would force us to conclude 
that Sherlock Holmes really existed. But this is counterintuitive. We know that 
Holmes does not and cannot exist in the actual world. In fact, Conan Doyle intended 
to tell us a story about a merely fictional character. Descriptivists have generally rec-
ognized the force of this argument, and their solution consists in adding some kind of 
reference to the specific act of storytelling by the author.  
 Kripke’s (1980) epistemological argument concerns the truth-value of a sentence 
like (1), which is allegedly true by definition, when we consider it with respect to cer-
tain imagined circumstances that are epistemically possible. If SD were correct, and (3) 
were analytically true, we should know it a priori, by mere reflection on the concepts 
synonymous with the name or associated with it (by stipulation or convention). Just as 
we know that ‘bachelors are unmarried men’ is true by definition, we would also know 
that ‘Sherlock Holmes is the Φ’ is true by definition. However, there seems to be a 
genuine difference between the two terms. It is difficult to imagine alternative circum-
stances in which ‘bachelors are married men’ is true, but it is not at all difficult to 
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imagine several alternative circumstances in which it turns out that ‘Sherlock Holmes 
is not the Φ’ is true. We can imagine circumstances in which Sherlock Holmes is not 
an intelligent English detective, that he does not live at 221B Baker Street, that he is 
not a pipe smoker, etc. We may even imagine alternative circumstances for the possi-
ble world of the story in which his parents baptized him with another name. Hence, 
we cannot rule out a priori that ‘Sherlock Holmes is not the Φ’ could be true. 
 Furthermore, Predelli (2009) points out a logical argument against SD nominalist 
theories, namely those descriptivist interpretations according to which the semantic 
content of a name n is given by a condition δ such as being called ‘n’. This is what he 
calls a content-necessary condition, i.e. a function kc from possible worlds to individu-
als such that for any possible world w, kc = i (where i is the individual that satisfies δ in 
w). The argument appeals to our inclinations to consider as invalid certain inferences 
entailed by SD. An example of an invalid inference goes from (4) to (5): 
 4. Socrates is wise. 
 5. There exist at least two individuals. 
Predelli uses the term ‘individuals’ to exclude properties, hence wisdom is not taken to 
be an individual. However, as he notes, one could add properties and then modify (5) 
to read there exist at least three individuals yet we would be faced with the same problem. 
In fact, no sentence of the form F(a) entails ∃x,y (x≠y); all that F(a) requires is that one 
individual be F. In our case it requires that one individual be wise. But for nominal SD 
there is a further condition on (4), one involving the existence of ‘Socrates’. Suppose 
that no individual bears this name in the possible world of context c, then [[Socra-
tes]]c,w would not satisfy the condition δ, being called ‘Socrates’, in the possible world of 
context c5. The content-necessary condition of SD would not be satisfied in that pos-
sible world. From this we reach the conclusion that there are two individuals i and j 
such that i bears j in cw. But this is not what is logically entailed by F(a). 
 Let us now consider what I call the disagreement argument, which was originally 
proposed by Stacie Friend (forthcoming). Take the following: 
 6. Gregor Samsa was transformed into a cockroach. 
 7. No, he was not. Gregor was transformed into a beetle. 
Vladimir Nabokov (1980) discusses the fact that after his awakening at the beginning 
of The Metamorphosis Gregor Samsa had been transformed into a beetle. He argues 
against the interpretation usually proposed by other commentators, who say that 
Gregor had been changed into a cockroach. But given that there is no Gregor, there is 
nothing for the commentators to discuss. Nevertheless, the disagreement seems to be 
genuine, and yet disagreement is possible when disputants have different attitudes to-
wards one and the same object. If, coherently with SD, the truth-conditional contribu-
                                                     
5 The formalism comes from standard double-index theory in which a semantic value [S]c,w is assigned to 
any sentence S with respect to a context c and a possible world w (i.e., in Kaplan’s terms, a circum-
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tion of ‘Gregor Samsa’ is a set of descriptions, then by changing just one of them one 
would change the set. So, when two literary critics A and B discuss whether Gregor 
was transformed into a cockroach or into a beetle, they would express two different 
propositional contents: 
 A: ‘If anyone is the unique Φ, then that is Gregor Samsa.’ 
 B: ‘If anyone is the unique Ψ, then that is Gregor Samsa.’ 
But then how could A and B disagree about the same thing? 
 A different version of the same argument can be applied to any potential version 
of WD. If we stipulate two different reference-fixing descriptions γ1 and γ2 for one 
and the same name as used in the same context cw, what we are actually doing is de-
termining two different contents for that name. If we stipulate that ‘Gregor Samsa’ be 
associated with the reference-fixing description γ1, being transformed into a beetle in cw, 
then γ1 will pick out whoever has been transformed into a beetle in cw. If, however, we 
stipulate that ‘Gregor Samsa’ be associated with the reference-fixing description γ2, be-
ing transformed into a cockroach in cw, then γ2 will pick out whoever has been transformed 
into a cockroach in cw. Hence, the two different conditions γ1 and γ2 will pick out two 
different referents for (6) and (7) and will determine two different contents for the 
two disputants. So, again, how could they disagree about the same thing? 
 There is a descriptivist version of the causal historical theory of reference known 
as causal descriptivism (for instance, see Kroon 1987), in which a token of a name n has 
the semantic value of the definite description ‘the individual dubbed in the ceremony 
connected by a causal-historical chain to t’, where t is a token of n. One might think 
that this version of descriptivism could block the disagreement argument. However, as 
Friend herself explains, this tentative solution will not really work because the same 
fictional character might have different names (e.g. ‘Odysseus’ and ‘Ulysses’, not to 
mention common cases of translation such as the English ‘Juliet’ and the Italian 
‘Giulietta’ in Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet) and still be taken to refer to the same 
character (without any ontological commitment). 
III 
Fictional names have no truth-conditional content. Classical Millians conclude that 
they are meaningless. But what can they say about sentences containing them? Most 
direct reference theorists and Millians think that sentences such as (1) do not express 
any proposition. In particular, Evans (1982) and Walton (1990) contend that in fiction 
one pretends to use fictional names as if they refer, but the problematic sentences do 
not have to be accepted as true. Pretense affects the force of certain speech acts: what 
looks like an assertion has to be treated as merely a pretend assertion. In particular, 
Walton’s view is that an utterance of (1) is an act of pretend assertion in a game of 
make-believe authorized by Conan Doyle’s A Study in Scarlet. Such an act is of a spe-
cific kind, which (following Walton) we shall call K. In any coherent theory of speech 
acts, the minimum conditions for the individuation of K should be offered not just in 
terms of its illocutionary force but also as a pair constituted by a sentence and its in-
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terpretation. But this is exactly what Walton denies: in his view there is no available in-
terpretation for the content of K. So, what is a speaker pretending to assert when ut-
tering (1)? How can we individuate K? 
 If there are no individuating conditions for K, one cannot distinguish a pretend as-
sertion of (1) from any other pretend assertion of sentences involving empty names 
because they all say the same thing, i.e. nothing at all. But in fact we do distinguish a 
pretend assertion of ‘Sherlock Holmes smokes a pipe’ from ‘Sherlock Holmes lives at 
221B Baker Street’, both said in a game of make-believe for Conan Doyle’s A Study in 
Scarlet. Furthermore, it is a fact that we can translate (1) into different languages. But 
what is the content that we translate from one language to another? How can we say 
that ‘Sherlock Holmes smokes a pipe’ has the same meaning as ‘Sherlock Holmes 
fuma la pipa’ in Italian or ‘Sherlock Holmes raucht eine Pfeife’ in German? How can 
these sentences say the same thing if they say nothing at all? Walton’s pretense theory 
clearly lacks the explanatory power to account not just for the intuitions of meaning-
fulness of fictional names but also for the individuation of speech acts like K and for 
intuitions of sameness of content. 
 The view that I will defend here is a form of sententialism partly inspired by Rich-
ard (1990) that is not susceptible to the usual criticisms of other sententialist versions 
of fictional discourse. For instance, Larson & Ludlow (1993) offer a sententialist 
analysis of fictional reports involving non-referring terms as uninterpreted logical 
forms. Within this framework, one could try to explain the notion of truth in fiction in 
terms of prescriptions to imagine that S, where S is an uninterpreted sentence. Ac-
cording to this view, the objects of fictional reports are uninterpreted sentences, thus 
there can be no distinction between believing (or imagining) that a sentence is true and 
believing (or imagining) that what the sentence says is true. Furthermore the proposal may 
be subject to the famous objection expressed by Church (1954) to the form of senten-
tialism defended by Carnap (1947) that was later amended by Putnam (1954). In Car-
nap’s version of sententialism, truth conditions depend on the logical structure of sen-
tences and on their specific syntactic items. So Church’s objection to the following fic-
tional case would be as follows: the translation of a sentence in English such as 
‘FICTK(Juliet is in love)’ into a corresponding sentence in Italian such as 
‘FICTK(Giulietta è innamorata)’, where FICTK is Lewis’s fictional operator, would re-
sult in the two sentences having different truth conditions. 
 Given the inadequacies of the standard referentialist proposal of Evans and 
Walton and the kind of sententialism for fictional discourse proposed by Larson and 
Ludlow, it is clear that any semantics for fictional reports must be propositional. This 
is in line with Richard’s own account of propositional attitude reports. What we need 
is to make the information encoded by utterances of sentences sensitive to the way in 
which readers grasp the proposition, while insisting that it is a singular proposition. 
 Sentences have syntactic structures that are given (more or less) by the output of a 
grammar and are usually called Phrase Structure Markers (henceforth PSMs). Linguists 
usually indicate PSMs with labeled bracketing, as the structure of an ordered set. An 
interpretation of a PSM is a corresponding ordered set with expressions replaced by 
intensions. The result is a set of structured intensions – that is, a proposition. In Rich-
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ard’s proposal, sentences in context express propositions that are represented as tuples 
of pairs of linguistic expressions and their interpretations, which he calls Russellian an-
notated matrices, comprising both the semantic contents of sentences and the contents 
of beliefs. However, strictly speaking it is not the linguistic expression itself (the syn-
tactic item) but rather the speaker’s internal representation associated with it that plays 
the role of a mode of presentation in propositional attitude ascriptions. In my view 
something similar can be said of fictional reports, but the solution I propose will dis-
pense with internal representations by focusing on constraints on the use of names. 
The subjective notion of an internal representation is in fact of no use for an account 
of the objective content of a story.  
 If one were to assume that a sentence such as ‘Holmes smokes’ is true if and only 
if [Holmes] is an element of {x: x smokes}, it would follow that the sentences below 
are both untrue (or false) because in fact neither [Holmes] nor [Watson] are elements 
of the class of smokers: 
 8. Holmes smokes. 
 9. Watson smokes. 
And yet we would like to say that (8) is fictionally true whereas (9) is fictionally false. 
So, we need to explain how these two fictional reports can have different truth-values 
and how a reader of A Study in Scarlet may in fact assent to (8) while denying (9), with-
out being irrational in doing so. 
 Let us use the ordered-pair representation of propositions expressed by simple 
sentences of the form F(n): <in, jF>, where i is the intension associated with n, if any, 
and j is the value of F. (8) and (9) express the same labeled proposition < gn, jF > 
where g is a dedicated element of the universe (the gap) assigned to both [Holmes] and 
[Watson] and j is the intension in predicate position for [smokes]. The simple sentence 
‘Holmes smokes’ is neither true nor false6, and the use of indexes to indicate the lexi-
cal items in the proposition literally expressed by (8) and (9) does not make any differ-
ence. For any fictional names n and m, <gn, jF> = <gm, jF >. Furthermore, following 
Lewis’s analyses of truth in fiction, any (interpreted) sentence F(n) embedded within 
the fictional operator might be true either by virtue of the author’s stipulation or be-
cause it is implicitly derivable from the explicit truths of the story in conjunction with 
factual premises and the overt beliefs of the author and her intended audience. And 
yet this leads us to conclude that in A Study in Scarlet both (8) and (9) must have the 
same truth-value. This is unacceptable. 
 The gappy proposition theory put forward by Braun (2005) has similar problems. 
It cannot account for the different truth-values of (8) and (9) and it cannot explain the 
rationality of a speaker’s assenting to and denying one and the same proposition. 
Braun takes belief to be a two-place relation between a subject and an object, but he 
has to appeal to ways of believing in order to explain the different beliefs a subject can 
have towards the same propositional content. Transferring the same strategy to a 
speaker assenting to (8) and denying (9), Braun would distinguish different ways in 
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which the same gappy proposition is imagined. When assenting to (8) a speaker imag-
ines the gappy proposition <_, being a smoker> in a Holmes-ish way, whereas when 
denying (9) the same speaker imagines the same gappy proposition but now in a Wat-
son-ish way. But as long as speakers can assent to and deny one and the same content 
their rationality cannot be preserved, so Braun’s solution is in fact no solution at all. 
 It is necessary to complete the theory with a technical move that differentiates (8) 
and (9) at the level of propositional content. At this point let me briefly introduce the 
notion of a name-using practice7. Fiction writers do not introduce a fictional name 
with the intention to refer. Conan Doyle knew that Sherlock Holmes did not exist, he 
was merely pretending to use the name as a genuine referring expression. But by tell-
ing his story to an audience he introduced them to a use, albeit a pretend one8. A fic-
tional name is passed from the author to his readers in communication chains where 
each utterance is causally linked to the original source. Participation in a name-using 
practice explains how we can have discriminatory knowledge of names without refer-
ents. We can distinguish uses of ‘Sherlock Holmes’ from uses of ‘Watson’ as intro-
duced by Conan Doyle in A Study in Scarlet not because we understand them as refer-
ring to different individuals, since there are in fact no fictional individuals. Rather, we 
distinguish them because their uses are causally linked to different name-using prac-
tices. Their uses are constrained by the causal links originated by the first act of intro-
duction of each one performed by Conan Doyle in his storytelling. 
 If a name-using practice were individuated by the sounds and spelling of a particu-
lar name, it would be impossible to give a unique account of the way in which we un-
derstand a name that undergoes a process of corruption and translation. Yet this 
would in fact be an inversion of the relation between a name and its name-using prac-
tice. Names are individuated by their name-using practices, and not vice versa. Let us 
distinguish between two subsets of the lexicon L: the set of names N and the set of 
predicate expressions E. Let us introduce the function f that takes elements of N to 
their name-using practices NP. Let {n ∈ N: f(n) = NP} be the class of names such 
that n1… nn ∈ {n ∈ N: f(n) = NP} if and only if f(n1) = f(nn). So, for instance, all trans-
lations of ‘Holmes’ belong to {n ∈ N: f(‘Holmes’) = NP}, i.e. the name-using practice 
of ‘Holmes’. The function f constrains proper uses of ‘Holmes’ (and of all its possible 
corruptions and translations) to its name-using practice. But this occurs before the 
semantic calculation starts. Perry (2001) theorized what he calls presemantic uses of context 
where context provides information for identifying an utterance, i.e. the words that are 
used, the language in which they are used, the syntactic structure and even the mean-
                                                     
7 Sainsbury (2005) introduced the expression ‘name-using practice’ to account for speakers’ understand-
ing of names. Here I offer only a brief sketch of my notion of name-using practices for fictional 
names. 
8 Whether one misunderstands the intentions of the author and uses a fictional name as if it were a genu-
ine referring expression, in the false belief that the name refers, or whether one correctly understands 
Conan Doyle’s intentions and uses the name in pretence, by imagining that it refers without actually 
believing that it does, neither of these possible approaches precludes the understanding of both kinds 
of utterances as uses of a name. 
Fictional Reports 
Theoria 68 (2010): 175-185 
183
ings with which they are used. For example, presemantic contexts disambiguate ho-
monymous words (as in Perry’s example of the word ‘Ich’, which might create ambi-
guity between the German translation of ‘I’ and the American word for expressing 
disgust), but they may also contribute to distinguishing between different names, in-
dependently of whether they refer or not. We can distinguish uses of ‘Holmes’ from 
uses of ‘Watson’ not because we understand them as referring to different individuals, 
since there are in fact no fictional individuals. Rather, we distinguish between them 
because their uses are causally linked to different name-using practices individuated by 
the first act of introduction of each one performed by Conan Doyle in A Study in Scar-
let. As a result, it is now clear that the logical structures of (8) and (9) can be distin-
guished by virtue of having different components, in this case different names, indi-
viduated by their different name-using practices. It follows that they also receive two 
different interpretations. 
 We can now formulate a rule for truth in fiction where j is the intension of the 
predicate expression e, n is a fictional name and ∩ is the operation of linking syntactic 
items: 
An utterance of ‘n∩e’ is true if and only if for some n ∈ {n ∈ N: f(‘n’) = NP}, 
the proposition <gn, je> is stipulated to be true in the fiction F by the author x 
or is derivable from the explicit truths stipulated by x in F. 
The quotation marks indicate a specific sentence S together with its syntactic items, 
but there is no reference to the specific internal composition of each of the syntactic 
items in S. In fact, for the purposes of my definition it does not matter whether S is an 
English or German sentence or whether the name in S is a translation of the original 
name introduced by the author. What is important is the internal logical structure of S 
and its interpretation. 
 It is now clear that (8) is certainly true in its fictional context whereas (9) is not: 
8. An utterance of ‘Holmes∩smokes’ is true if and only if for some ‘Holmes’ ∈ {n 
∈ N: f(‘Holmes’) = NP}, the proposition <gHolmes, smokes> is stipulated to be 
true in A Study in Scarlet by Conan Doyle or is derivable from the explicit truths 
stipulated by Conan Doyle in A Study in Scarlet. 
9. An utterance of ‘Watson∩smokes’ is true if and only if for of ‘Watson’ ∈ {n 
∈ N: f(‘Watson’) = NP}, the proposition <gWatson, smokes> is stipulated to be 
true in A Study in Scarlet by Conan Doyle or is derivable from the explicit truths 
stipulated by Conan Doyle in A Study in Scarlet. 
Conan Doyle did not stipulate that the sentence ‘Watson∩smokes’, where ‘Watson’ ∈ 
{n ∈ N: f(‘Watson’) = NP}, is true in A Study in Scarlet, and a speaker’s different atti-
tudes towards (8) and (9) can now be distinguished as having two different proposi-
tional objects. A speaker assenting to a report of (8) and denying a report of (9) is now 
perfectly rational in doing so. Furthermore, we now also have a solution to Friend’s 
disagreement argument. Proper uses of ‘Gregor Samsa’ are constrained by the same 
name-using practice, so that we now have: 
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6. An utterance of ‘Gregor∩Samsa∩was∩transformed∩into∩a∩cockroach’ is true 
if and only if for some ‘Gregor Samsa’ ∈ {n ∈ N: f(‘Gregor Samsa’) = NP}, the 
proposition <gGregor Samsa, being-transformed-into-a-cockroach> is stipulated to 
be true in The Metamorphosis by Franz Kafka or is derivable from the explicit 
truths stipulated by Kafka in The Metamorphosis. 
7. An utterance of ‘Gregor∩Samsa∩was∩transformed∩into∩a∩beetle’ is true if 
and only if for some ‘Gregor Samsa’ ∈ {n ∈ N: f(‘Gregor Samsa’) = NP}, the 
proposition <gGregor Samsa, being-transformed-into-a-beetle> is stipulated to be 
true in The Metamorphosis by Franz Kafka or is derivable from the explicit truths 
stipulated by Kafka in The Metamorphosis. 
Disputants can disagree about (6), the proposition <gGregor Samsa, being-transformed-
into-a-cockroach>, by assenting to and denying it as they can do with (7), once the use 
of the name in (6) and the use of the name in (7) have been individuated as con-
strained by the same relevant name-using practice. 
IV 
In this essay I have described what I consider to be the inadequacies of the standard 
descriptivist and referentialist semantics for fictional reports and put forward an origi-
nal account of how we might interpret fictional reports containing fictional names. 
Fictional names do not refer, and yet they can be distinguished from one another not 
on the basis of their contents (they have none) but by virtue of having different causal 
histories. The information communicated through each name-using practice does not 
play a role in fixing the referent of the name. Rather, the discriminatory work should 
be explained in causal terms. We distinguish uses of ‘Holmes’ from uses of ‘Watson’ 
by individuating their different causal histories in the presemantic uses of context. 
Logical structures of sentences containing one or other, or even both, of the two 
names inherit these distinctions in the sense that two different names (with different 
histories) are involved and offer a further tool for discrimination between sentences. 
Different interpretations follow. Surely this view might be further developed by ac-
counting, for instance, for derivations of implicit fictional truths from the explicit 
truths and by extending the proposal to other kinds of fictional discourse such as sto-
rytelling by authors and debates between literary critics. 
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